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Since the 1980s one of the main streams of research investigating the conditions for sustained
economic growth has viewed the accumulation of capital, broadly measured, as one of its
key sources. This approach, often termed the “AK” framework, has been propagated, among
others, by authors such as Romer (1986), Barro (1990), and Rebelo (1991). In its canonical,
single-factor form, the AK model yields a constant balanced growth rate with no transitional
dynamics. In contrast to the standard Solow model, tax and government infrastructure pol-
icy (see Barro, 1990) affects the growth rate by changing the rate of return on capital.
The studies cited above all employ the representative agent (RA) framework. In this pa-
per we seek to extend the insights of the AK setting by adopting the overlapping generations
(OLG) approach to specifying the consumer sector. Speciﬁcally, we use the Blanchard (1985)-
Yaari (1965) continuous-time framework to model the decisions of ﬁnite-lived consumers. A
central characteristic of the Blanchard-Yaari (BY) model is the demographic turnover from
old to young population cohorts. Since the asset-poor young replace the asset-rich old in
this setting, demographic turnover inﬂuences the economy’s saving and, thus, its accumula-
tion of capital. A key advantage, then, of the BY framework is that it enables us to consider
how demographic parameters inﬂuence economic growth in the AK context in which capital
accumulation plays the decisive role. Since population dynamics obviously depends on fac-
tors such as birth and mortality rates, we can use our model to investigate how demographic
shocks affect the balanced growth rate.1 Due to its well-deﬁned population dynamics, we
can use the BY model to investigate the effects of public policies, in particular, Pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pensions, that have a signiﬁcant intergenerational component.
Another important property of the BY framework, as recently shown by Fisher and Heij
dra (2008) in an exogenous growth setting, is that the importance of demographic turnover
also depends on agents’ preferences, speciﬁcally on their attitude to status. In our endoge-
nous growth framework, this allows us to ask the question whether or not status compe-
tition is an engine of economic growth. Recent authors who investigate this issue using
an endogenous growth, representative agent (RA) framework that speciﬁes consumption as
the reference good include Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), and
Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007). The speciﬁcation used by these authors is often termed the
“Keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) speciﬁcation of status preferences.2 This literature does
1In non-endogenous growth contexts, recent authors who employ the BY framework to consider the effects of
demographic shocks include Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) and Bettendorf and Heijdra (2006), the latter employing
a small open economy framework. In this research demographic shocks are time-dependent, though cohort
independent, an approach we follow here.
2Strictly speaking, the Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) employ a “Catch-
1not, however, deliver an unambiguous answer regarding whether or not status competition
is growth-promoting. Indeed, the relationship between status and growth in this context is
highly sensitive to the speciﬁcation of preferences and technology.3
The RA model is, moreover, a restrictive one to analyze the implications of status prefer-
ences, since all agents end up with the same consumption and asset holdings in the symmet-
ric equilibrium, a situation implying that no one wins the “rat race”. In contrast, agents of
different ages, or “vintages”, in the OLG framework possess distinct stocks of wealth and en-
joy distinct levels of consumption. An economy-wide shift in KUJ then has age-dependent
effects in the OLG context. A framework in which differences among individuals persist
over time is, we believe, a promising avenue to explore the macroeconomic implications of
status competition. Another important task in this paper, then, is to extend the ﬁndings of
Fisher and Heijdra (2008) to the endogenous growth context and to consider the implications
of changes in the degree of status preference.
Among our results, we show that the balanced growth rate, due to intergenerational
turnover in ﬁnancial wealth, is lower in the BY framework compared to its RA counter-
part. We also consider demographic disturbances characteristic of advanced societies; falls
in fertility and rises in longevity. In this context we ﬁnd that while a decline in fertility and
a rise in longevity both increase the growth rate, they have opposite implications for the
consumption-capital ratio: the latter rises in response to a “baby bust” and falls subsequent
to a jump in life-expectancy. Furthermore, we show that an increase in the degree of sta-
tus preference lowers economic growth, since generational turnover, which tends to reduce
growth, becomes more important in this scenario. Finally, in the second part of the paper,
we investigate the implications of incorporating a PAYG pension system, featuring an ex-
ogenous retirement date. We ﬁnd that economic growth is higher, given our design of the
scheme, under PAYG. Again, it is demographic turnover that provides the source for this
result. Speciﬁcally, PAYG pensions introduce a ‘wedge’ between the human wealth of new-
borns and the average stock of human wealth. Since newborns possess more human wealth
than older agents under the PAYG system, the intergenerational turnover in human wealth
provides a countervailing element to the turnover in ﬁnancial wealth, which, as indicated,
lowers economic growth in the BY framework.
ing up with the Joneses” approach in which reference consumption depends on past consumption and evolves
over time.
3Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the role of reference consumption in determining the response to
macroeconomic shocks depends on whether AK or the more ﬂexible Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed. In
LiuandTurnovsky(2005)theeffectofKUJonbalancedgrowthisafunctionoftheintertemporalelasticityofsub-
stititution. Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) show that consumption externalities affect the long-run equilibrium
if and only if work effort is endogenous.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the ﬁrm and household sectors of
the economy, which are aggregated in section 3 to determine the macroeconomic equilib-
rium. Section 4 derives the balanced rate of endogenous growth, while section 5 investigates
how the latter is inﬂuenced by demographic and status preference shocks. Section 6 intro-
duces the PAYG system into our OLG framework, which we analyze in section 7. There,
we consider, ﬁrst, the effect of public pensions on the rate of growth and, second, how an
increase in the statutory retirement age inﬂuences the growth rate in both deﬁned beneﬁt
and deﬁned contribution schemes. We close in section 8 with brief concluding remarks and
include an appendix containing supporting mathematical results.
2 The Macroeconomy
2.1 Firms
We begin by ﬁrst analyzing the economy’s ﬁrm sector. This permits us to describe the engine
of endogenous growth, which relies, in the spirit of Romer (1989) and Saint-Paul (1992), on
an inter-ﬁrm externality. The latter also leads to a constant (real) interest rate, a result that
simpliﬁes the derivation of the macroeconomic equilibrium. The ﬁrm sector is made up
of a large number of perfectly competitive ﬁrms producing a homogenous good. At the
individual ﬁrm level, output technology is Cobb-Douglas:
Yi (t) = F[Ki (t), Li (t)] ≡ Z(t)   Ki (t)
ε Li (t)
1−ε , 0 < ε < 1, (1)
where Yi (t) represents net output4 of ﬁrm i, Ki (t) is the capital stock, Li (t) is labor supply
(coinciding here with the population), and Z(t) is total factor productivity common to all
ﬁrms. For simplicity, we assume that capital accumulation does not incur adjustment costs.
As usual under proﬁt maximization, the rental values of capital and labor correspond to




= (1− ε) Z(t)   ki (t)
ε , r(t) =
∂Yi (t)
∂Ki (t)
= εZ(t)   ki (t)
ε−1 , (2)
where ki(t) ≡ Ki(t)/Li(t) is the capital-labor ratio. Moreover, since each ﬁrm faces the same
wage rate and rental rate of capital, each has the same capital-labor ratio, ki(t) = k(t), which
implies that ﬁrm output corresponds to Yi(t) = Z(t)Li(t)kε(t). To obtain economy-wide
relationships, we deﬁne: Y(t) ≡ ∑i Yi(t), K(t) ≡ ∑i Ki(t), and L(t) ≡ ∑i Li(t). In turn, the
inter-ﬁrm externality is given by:
Z(t) = Z0   k(t)1−ε, Z0 > 0, (3)
4That is, net output incorporates capital stock depreciation
3which implies that individual ﬁrms in this setting beneﬁt from a rise in the average capital
intensity. Aggregating ﬁrm output and substituting for Z(t) = Z0   k(t)1−ε, we obtain the
linear-in-capital, economy-wide production function Y (t) = Z0K(t). Substituting Z(t) =
Z0   k(t)1−ε into the marginal productivity conditions (2), we calculate expressions for the
wage and the interest rate:
w(t) = (1− ε)y(t) = (1− ε) Z0k(t), r(t) = r = εZ0 > 0. (4)
Clearly, the interest rate is a positive constant, a result that is the source of continued growth.
In contrast, agents can look forward to ongoing wage growth in this setting.
2.2 Households
We assume that the economy consists of agents of different birth dates, or “vintages”, who
comparetheirownconsumption ¯ c(v,τ) totheaveragelevelofconsumption c(τ). Following




ln ¯ x(v,τ)e(ρ+β)(t−τ)dτ, (5)
where ρ is the rate of time preference, β is the given instantaneous death probability (inde-
pendent of age), and ¯ x(v,τ) is the instantaneous subfelicity function deﬁned as:
¯ x(v,τ) ≡
¯ c(v,τ) − αc(τ)
1− α
, α < 1, (6)
where the parameter α determines the agent’s attitude to status competition. If 0 < α < 1,
agents exhibit jealousy of the consumption of others. On the other hand, if α < 0, then agents
expressadmirationfortheconsumptionofothers. Thepreferencesin(6)satisfytheconditions
for “Keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ).5
The budget identity of an agent born at time v equals:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = (r + β) ¯ a(v,τ) + w(τ) − ¯ c(v,τ), (7)
where ¯ a(v,τ) representsassets, r istheﬁxedinterestrate, and w(τ) isthecohort-independent
wage rate earned by agents who supply one unit of work effort. Assets yield an annuity in-
come of (r + β)¯ a(v,τ), which consists of interest payments r¯ a(v,τ) and annuity receipts
β¯ a(v,τ). Employing the usual methods of optimal control, we calculate the following time-
proﬁle for ¯ x(v,τ):
˙ ¯ x(v,τ)
¯ x(v,τ)
= r − ρ, r > ρ. (8)
5KUJ is satisﬁed with U[ ] ≡ lnx(v,τ), since ∂2U[ ]/∂¯ c∂c = c/(c − α¯ c)2 > 0. See Dupor and Liu (2003) and
Liu and Turnovsky (2005) for a detailed characterization of relative consumption preferences.
4The necessary condition r > ρ implies that we focus on a given rising proﬁle of ¯ x(v,τ). In (8)
wealsoobtain the usualBY-resultthat the probability ofdeath β cancels outalong individual
time-proﬁles, since the (higher) annuity rate of return r + β is offset by the (greater) effec-
tive rate of time preference ρ + β.6 In fact, at the aggregate level, the crucial demographic
parameter (see (16) below) is the fertility rate, denoted by η.
The next step is to calculate the intertemporal budget constraint of the individual. Inte-
grating (7) subject to the NPG condition limτ→∞ ¯ a(v,τ)e(r+β)(t−τ) = 0, yields:
  ∞
t
[(1− α) ¯ x(v,τ) + αc(τ)]e(r+β)(t−τ)dτ = ¯ a(v,t) + h(t), (9)
where h(t) =
  ∞
t w(τ)e(r+β)(t−τ)dτ is age-independent human wealth.7 Equation (9) states
that the present discounted value of a weighted average of individual subfelicity and av-
erage consumption—where the weights depend on the parameter α—corresponds to the
aggregate of the agent’s ﬁnancial and human wealth. Integrating (8) to obtain ¯ x(v,τ) =




= ¯ a(v,t) + h(t) − αΓ(t), (10)
where Γ(t) ≡
  ∞
t c(τ)e(r+β)(t−τ)dτ. Substitution of ¯ x(v,t) from (6) in (10), yields an ex-
pression for individual consumption that is a function of average consumption as well as
wealth:
¯ c(v,t) = (ρ + β)[¯ a(v,t) + h(t)] + α[c(t) − (ρ + β)Γ(t)]. (11)
Among the features that emerge from (11) is that individual consumption depends on aver-
age consumption, due to the existence of a consumption externality, i.e., α  = 0. Otherwise,
an agent consumes—as in the standard setting—out of his wealth according to ρ + β, the
marginal propensity to consume.
3 Aggregation and the Macroeconomic Equilibrium
In this section of the paper we ﬁrst specify the economy’s demography. This is necessary
to aggregate the individual relationships and, thus, to describe the OLG macroeconomy.
Letting η represent the birth rate, the (constant) population growth rate is n ≡ η − β, with β,
6Neverthless, the level of an agent’s consumption does depend on β.
7Observe that in a growth context in which wages follow the path w(τ) = w(t)eˆ γ(τ−t) (where the growth rate
ˆ γ is determined in section 4), human wealth depends on time, t, but not on the agent’s age, t − v. In contrast,
human wealth will be both time- and age-dependent once we introduce a PAYG system in section 6 below.
5as indicated, the mortality probability. Through time, individual population cohorts L(v,t)









l (v,t) ¯ c(v,t)dv, a(t) ≡
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ¯ a(v,t)dv, (13)
where c(t) represents, furthermore, the consumption externality from the individual’s point
of view. Aggregating individual consumption (11), we obtain:
c(t) = (ρ + β)[a(t) + h(t)] + α[c(t) − (ρ + β)Γ(t)]. (14)
Subtracting (14) from (11), we ﬁnd:
¯ c(v,t) − c(t) = (ρ + β)[¯ a(v,t) − a(t)], (15)
where the difference between individual and average consumption depends on the differ-
ence between individual and average ﬁnancial wealth, a fact we use below to draw the
distinctions between the BY and RA frameworks.
The key step to derive the growth equilibrium is to obtain the differential equations for
average consumption and ﬁnancial assets, ˙ c(t) and ˙ a(t). The details of this exercise are given
in Appendix A. Using the expressions for ˙ c(t) and ˙ a(t), the rate of return and aggregate
relationships of the production sector, and the fact that only physical capital is used for
savings, k(t) ≡ a(t), we derive the following macroeconomic equilibrium:
˙ c(t)
c(t)
= r − ρ −






˙ k(t) = [r − n]k(t) + w(t) − c(t), (17)
w(t) = (1− ε)y(t), r = εZ0, (18)
y(t) = Z0k(t). (19)
The dynamics of consumption is described by (16), while (17) governs the accumulation of
physical capital, n ≡ η − β. Equation (18) reiterates the expressions for the wage and the
interest rate, while (19) is the per-capita version of the production function. In contrast to
equations (17)–(19), which emerge in the usual Ramsey framework, equation (16) for con-
sumption dynamics merits additional comment. The third term on the right-hand-side of
(16) is typical in the BY-setting and represents the effect that demographic turnover has on
6consumption dynamics and, as we show below, economic growth. To see this, we evalu-
ate (15) at v = t and impose k(t) ≡ a(t). This yields c(t) − ¯ c(t,t) = (ρ + β)k(t), which, if
substituted in (16), results in the following alternative representation of ˙ c(t)/c(t):
˙ c(t)
c(t)







The term [c(t)− ¯ c(t,t)], corresponding to the difference between average and new-born con-
sumption, measures the effect of intergenerational turnover. In the BY-framework older
generations are replaced by newborns. Because, however, agents are born with no ﬁnancial
wealth, their consumption levels fall short of that of their older counterparts. Consequently,
the replacement of asset-rich by asset-poor population cohorts reduces the growth rate of av-
erage consumption. This is the case even though the growth rate of individual consumption,
˙ ¯ c(v,τ)/¯ c(v,τ), is the same for each generation facing the given interest rate r.
4 Steady-State Growth
In this model the single accumulable factor of production, physical capital, has the constant
returns to scale property. Consequently, the long-run equilibrium is characterized by a sus-
tained, balanced growth rate, denoted by ˆ γ. Furthermore, the economy exhibits no transi-
tional dynamics. To see why this is the case, let x(t) ≡ c(t)/k(t) represent the consumption-
capital ratio and employ (16)–(19) to derive ˙ x(t)/x(t):
˙ x(t)
x(t)
= [r − ρ + Z0 − n] + x(t) −






It is straightforward to show that (21) is an unstable differential equation. Consequently, a
stable equilibrium is achieved only if the consumption-capital ratio attains a constant value,
x(t) ≡ ˆ x, ∀t ≥ 0, which, in turn, implies that the economy grows at the rate ˆ γ through
time. The resulting steady-state growth proﬁles of capital, wages, and consumption are
ˆ k(t) = ˆ k0eˆ γt, ˆ w(0) = ˆ w0eˆ γt, and ˆ c(t) = ˆ c0eˆ γt, where ˆ k(0) = ˆ k0, ˆ w(0) = ˆ w0, and ˆ c(0) = ˆ c0
denote their respective initial values.
To determine the solution for the balanced growth rate, we evaluate (16)–(17) along the
steady-state proﬁle:
ˆ γ = r − ρ −




, ˆ γ = r + (1− ε) Z0 − n − ˆ x, (22)
where ˆ x ≡ ˆ c/ˆ k is the consumption-capital ratio. To further simplify the problem, we deﬁne
the growth-adjusted interest rate as ˆ rg ≡ r − ˆ γ and re-express (22) as:
 
ˆ rg − ρ
 
ˆ x =
η (ρ + β)
1− α
, ˆ x = ˆ rg + (1− ε) Z0 − n. (23)






























Figure 1: Growth and the KUJ effect
Combining the relationships in (23), we form the polynomial Φ(s):
Φ(s) ≡ (s − ρ)   [s + (1− ε) Z0 − n] −
η (ρ + β)
1− α
, (24)
where Φ(ˆ rg) = 0 solves for the growth-adjusted interest rate ˆ rg. There is only one feasible
solution with ˆ x > 0. This is satisﬁed with ˆ rg ≡ r − ˆ γ > ρ and ˆ rg > n − (1− ε)Z0.8 The Euler
and market clearing relationships can also be combined to determine the polynomial Γ(s)
that solves for the consumption-capital ratio, i.e., Γ(ˆ x) = 0:
Γ(s) ≡ s2 − [ρ + (1− ε) Z0 − n]s −




sloped locus EEBY represents the Euler equation, while the downward-sloping line CA de-




     
EEBY
= −
η (ρ + β)




     
CA
= −1.
8In Appendix B we derive the conditions for a feasible solution of the steady-state growth proﬁle. In particu-
lar, we show that ˆ rg > ρ is necessary for ¯ k(0,t) > 0. We also determine the necessary conditions for ¯ c(0,t) > 0,
along with the upper and lower bounds on the status parameter α.
8The intersection of EEBY and CA at point E1 illustrates the OLG solution (ˆ x1, ˆ γ1) deter-
mined by (24)–(25). The positively-sloped EEBY locus reﬂects the fact that the higher is the
consumption-capital ratio ˆ x, the weaker is the intergenerational turnover effect, which im-
plies a greater growth rate. Along the negatively-sloped CA line, higher values of ˆ x translate
directly into lower rates of growth ˆ γ. In addition, we depict in Figure 1 the solid horizontal
line EERA representing the Euler equation for the RA case.9 Observe that it lies uniformly
above its EEBY counterpart. The growth rate in the RA economy is simply the difference be-
tween the ﬁxed interest rate and the given rate of time preference, r − ρ (so that ˆ rg = ρ). The
relationships in Figure 1 are generated using a numerical solution of the model that assumes
the structural parameters take the following values:
ε = 0.20, r = 0.06, ρ = 0.04, α = 0, β = 0.02, η = 0.03. (26)
Clearly, the balanced growth rate ˆ γ is lower in the BY case compared to its RA counterpart,
while the consumption-capital ratio ˆ x is higher. Indeed, while the balanced growth rate in
the RA economy depends only on technology and the pure of rate of time preference, in the
BY setting it is also a function of agents’ attitude to status, parameterized by α, as well as
demographic parameters, η and β, that reﬂect intergenerational turnover. We next employ
our OLG equilibrium to investigate the effect of changes in agents’ attitude to consumption
externalities and one-time demographic shocks.
5 Comparative Static Effects
To determine the effects of demographic and status preference shocks on the OLG growth
rate, we evaluate (24)–(25) at the solution values (ˆ x, ˆ rg):
Φ(ˆ rg,η, β,α) ≡
 




ˆ rg + (1− ε) Z0 − (η − β)
 
−
η (ρ + β)
1− α
≡ 0, (27)
Γ(ˆ x,η, β,α) = ˆ x2 − [ρ + (1− ε) Z0 − (η − β)] ˆ x −
η (ρ + β)
1− α
≡ 0.
In all instances, the economy jumps immediately its new steady-state growth path. We con-
sider ﬁrst the consequences of an increase in jealousy (i.e., α rises from 0 to 0.5). Using (27),






















∂Γ(ˆ x,η, β,α)/∂ˆ x
> 0,
9The expressions for the RA version of the model with population growth are obtained by setting η = 0 (no
new disconnected agents enter the economy) and β = −n (population growth consists of the arrival of new
family members).
9where the signs in (28) imply that a rise in α causes a decline in the growth rate and an
increase in the consumption-capital ratio. The larger is the status externality, the more im-
portant is intergenerational turnover, which implies that average consumption rises at the
expense of saving, leading to a permanent fall in ˆ γ and rise in ˆ x. In terms of Figure 1, the in-
crease in α causes the EEBY to shift down (CA is unaffected), leading to the new equilibrium
featuring a lower value of ˆ γ and an increase in ˆ x. This is the endogenous growth analogue
of the result of Fisher and Heijdra (2008), showing that a rise in status preference leads in
steady state to a decline in the stock of capital and a rise in consumption. The distinction
is that here adjustment takes place instantly, while the Fisher and Heijdra (2008) ﬁndings
feature an initial increase in consumption, followed by a continuous decline in its level, ac-
companied by a reduction in the capital stock. For comparison, observe that we also depict
in Figure 1 the case of admiration, i.e., a fall in α from 0 to −0.5, causing EEBY to shift-up and
resulting in a rise in ˆ γ and a fall in ˆ x.
Considering next the case of a baby bust (η falls from 0.03 to 0.02), differentiation of (27)






















∂Γ(ˆ x,η, β,α)/∂ˆ x
< 0,
wherethesignsin(29)followfrom ˆ rg > ρ and ˆ rg > n−(1−ε)Z0. Accordingto(29), adecline
in fertility, since it reduces the importance of intergenerational turnover, leads to an increase
in economic growth and rise in the consumption-capital ratio. Graphically, this shock is
illustrated in Figure 2, where the post-shock Euler and the market clearing relationships
(dashed) result in a new equilibrium with higher values of ˆ γ and ˆ x.






















∂Γ(ˆ x,η, β,α)/∂ˆ x
> 0,
thatthisleadstoahighergrowthrateand—incontrasttoababybust—alowerconsumption-
capital ratio. Because agents live longer, they have the incentive to accelerate the accumu-
lation of capital, increasing the balanced growth rate ˆ γ. Since, however, this is spread-out
over a longer lifetime, consumption falls relative to the stock of capital. We also illustrate this
in Figure 2, which depicts the shift-up in EEBY and the shift-down in CA (dash-dotted) that
leads to an increase in ˆ γ and a fall in ˆ x.
10The sign of ∂ˆ rg/∂β follows from that of ∂Φ/∂β, which equals ˆ rg − ρ − η/(1 − α) < 0. Since we can show
























Figure 2: Growth and demographic shocks
6 Introducing a PAYG Pension System
We now extend the basic growth model to incorporate a PAYG pension system. Letting
¯ z(v,τ) denote taxes (and transfers if negative), contributions are paid and beneﬁts are re-
ceived according the following scheme:
¯ z(v,τ) =
 
θ   w(τ) for τ − v ≤ uR
−π   w(τ) for τ − v > uR
, (31)
where θ is the contribution rate, π is the beneﬁt rate (both indexed to the wage w(τ)), and
uR is the statutory retirement age. For realism, we assume that workers earn more than
pensioners so that 1− θ > π. As in the benchmark speciﬁcation, labor supply is exogenous,
although modiﬁed to reﬂect mandatory retirement:
¯ n(v,τ) =
 
1 for τ − v ≤ uR
0 for τ − v > uR
. (32)
According to (32), agents supply a “full” unit of labor until retirement after which they cease






¯ n(v,t)l (v,t)dv =
  t
t−uR
l (v,t)dv = 1− e−ηuR, (33)
11where N(t) is the work force. Clearly, the participation rate rises with uR, while a “baby
bust” (decline in η) reduces it. This formulation allows us to deﬁne the dependency ratio as:









Not only does the PAYG system place a “wedge” between the workforce and the population,
it also implies that an agent’s human wealth is age-dependent. Letting ¯ h(v,τ) represent




l (v,t) ¯ h(v,t)dv. (35)
Next, we impose sustainability of the PAYG system by assuming that contributions always











= π   e−ηuR, (37)
where one of θ, uR, and π must be used to balance the PAYG budget. Observe that under a
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) scheme, π and uR are held constant while θ balances the budget. In con-
trast, θ and uR are held constant while π balances the budget under a deﬁned contribution
(DC) scheme. It is straightforward to show that the following relationships hold:










∂(1− θ − π)
∂uR
> 0 (for DB),
∂(1− θ − π)
∂uR
< 0 (for DC). (39)
These results are important to investigate how a change in the statutory retirement date
affects the balanced growth rate.
To solve the modiﬁed model, we follow the same procedure outlined above. The ﬁrm’s
problem is solved as in section 2.1, with Li(t) replaced by Ni(t) in (1), and with K(t)/N (t)
affecting general productivity in (3). Since labor supply, according to (33), depends on the
retirement date uR, so does the wage rate w(t):





1− e−ηuR , (40)
12where we substitute for Y(t) = Z0K(t), N(t) ≡ [1 − e−ηuR]L(t) and use k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t) to
obtain (40). Observe that for a given value of k(t), a later retirement date lowers the wage
rate due to the expansion in labor supply.
Regarding the household’s problem, we proceed along the same lines as above, with the
exception that the agent’s choices are made subject to (31). Consequently, we replace (7) by:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = [r(τ) + β] ¯ a(v,τ) + w(τ) − ¯ c(v,τ) − ¯ z(v,τ). (41)
Similarly, we replace h(t) with ¯ h(v,t) in the expression (11) for individual consumption. In















where we use (31) to obtain the second equality of (42). Substituting the path of wages in











+ π   e(ˆ rg+β)(t−v−uR)
 
, t−v ≤ uR. (43)
Correspondingly, a retired person’s human wealth is given by:





ˆ rg + β
, t − v > uR. (44)
To determine the economy’s Euler equation, we use the method described in Appendix
A for the standard formulation. It is straightforward to show that (16) becomes:
˙ c(t)
c(t)
= r(t) − ρ −












h(t)], in human wealth. We show in Appendix C that [¯ h(t,t) − h(t)] equals:
¯ h(t,t) − h(t) = w(t)e−βuR (1− θ − π)  
e−nuR − e−ˆ rguR
ˆ rg − n
> 0, (46)
where 1 − θ > π.12 Clearly, agents are born with more human wealth than average, since
they can look forward to the relatively longest period of high earnings. Moreover, the PAYG






12Two further things are worth noting. First, the sign of (46) is guaranteed because e−nuR−e−ˆ rguR
ˆ rg−n is positive
regardless of the sign of ˆ rg − n. Second, under the Aaron condition, ˆ rg > n, it follows that for a given retirement
age uR, a newborn has a lower level of human wealth under the PAYG system than in the absence of such a
system (see Appendix D).
13system affects the macroeconomy through the turnover in human wealth. Indeed, because
newborn agents possess more human wealth than their older counterparts, this mitigates the
fact that newborns are “asset poor” ﬁnancially compared to older agents. This lessens the
effects of intergenerational turnover in (45) and increases the growth in average consumption
compared to an economy without a PAYG scheme, a result we prove subsequently. To sum-
up, PAYG macroeconomic equilibrium consists of (45), where [¯ h(t,t)−h(t)] is given by (46).
The expressions for the interest rate are the same as stated in (18)–(19), while we replace the
expression for the wage with (40). Finally, regarding market clearing, we replace (17) with:13




7 Pension Policy and Economic Growth
To investigate the implications of pension policy for economic growth, we ﬁrst derive the
modiﬁed economic dynamics. For the Euler relationship we substitute the equation for the
wage w(t) from (40) in that of [¯ h(t,t) − h(t)] from (46) and use y(t) = Z0k(t). We then
substitute the resulting expression in (45) to calculate:
˙ c(t)
c(t)








where ˆ rg ≡ r − ˆ γ, σ ≡ η (ρ + β)/(1− α) is a positive constant, and:
Ω(ˆ rg) ≡ 1−
(1− ε)r
ε
  dr(uR)   (1− θ − π)  
1− e−(ˆ rg−n)uR
ˆ rg − n
> 0.
Observe that the difference between (48) and the Euler equation of the basic model (16) is
that per capita consumption growth now depends on Ω(ˆ rg), which is itself a function of ˆ γ
and incorporates features of the pension system. Similarly, combining (47) with (40) and
y(t) = Z0k(t), the market clearing condition simpliﬁes to:
˙ k(t) = [r + (1− ε) Z0 − n]k(t) − c(t). (49)
Evaluating (48)–(49) along the steady-state growth path ˆ γ and, as before, letting ˆ x ≡ ˆ c/ˆ k, we
obtain:
ˆ γ = r − ρ − σΩ(r − ˆ γ)  
1
ˆ x
, ˆ γ = r + (1− ε) Z0 − ˆ x − n. (50)
Observe that the expression for market clearing is identical to that from the basic model,
implying that PAYG pensions affect the growth path only through the Euler relationship. To
13See Appendix C for the derivation of (47).
14distinguish the framework with public pensions from that of the basic framework, we let ˆ rP
g
(≡ r− ˆ γP) and ˆ xP represent, respectively, thegrowth-adjustedinterestrateandconsumption-
capital ratio under the PAYG plan. The system (50) becomes:
(ˆ rP
g − ρ)   ˆ xP = σΩ(ˆ rP
g), ˆ xP = ˆ rP
g + (1− ε) Z0 − n (51)











g + (1− ε) Z0 − n
 
− σΩ(ˆ rP
g) ≡ 0, (52)
where we indicate in (52) that the solution depends on the parameters of the PAYG system.





= (ˆ xP)2 − [ρ + (1− ε) Z0 − n] ˆ xP − σΩ(ˆ rP
g) ≡ 0. (53)
We next show that the economy with PAYG pensions has a higher growth rate and a
lower consumption-capital ratio than the economy lacking them. To do so, we linearize the
polynomial Φ(s) given in (24) from the basic model about the PAYG equilibrium determined
in (52). This yields:
(ˆ rP
g − ρ)   [ˆ rP
g + (1− ε) Z0 − n] − σ + [2ˆ rP
g − (ρ + n) + (1− ε) Z0]   (ˆ rg − ˆ rP
g) = 0. (54)
Evaluating the ﬁrst term in (54) at the PAYG equilibrium using (52), we solve for (ˆ rg − ˆ rP
g) =
(ˆ γP − ˆ γ):
ˆ rg − ˆ rP




g − (ρ + n) + (1− ε) Z0
> 0, (55)
which implies that the balanced rate of growth is higher if agents receive PAYG pensions.14
The reason for our ﬁnding is that the PAYG system imposes a life-cycle on human wealth
that does not otherwise obtain in the standard BY framework. In our speciﬁcation the PAYG
pension puts part of the population, since (1 − θ) > π, in a lower non-asset income stream.
This strengthens the effect of the turnover in human wealth, [¯ h(t,t)−h(t)] > 0, since agents
are now born with relatively more human wealth than their older counterparts who face re-
duced non-asset retirement income. This, in turn, weakens the negative implications that
demographic turnover has, in general, on economic growth. Under consumption smooth-
ing, agents respond to the fall in old-age income by increasing saving during their working
14The sign of (55) is positive since:
1− Ω(ˆ rg) =
(1− ε)r
ε
dr(πR)(1− θ − π)
1− e−(ˆ rg−n)uR
ˆ rg − n
> 0.



























Figure 3: Growth, pensions, and the KUJ effect
lives, which raises the rate of capital accumulation and implies that ˆ γP > ˆ γ. In turn, the
expression for ˆ x − ˆ xP, obtained by linearizing Γ(s) from (25) about the equilibrium solved
for in (53), equals:




g − (ρ + n) + (1− ε) Z0
< 0, (56)
We depict in Figure 3 the inﬂuence of PAYG, where the baseline pension system parame-
ters equal:




The growth equilibrium with pensions is illustrated by the intersection of the solid EEBY and
CA relationships: since the solid EEBY locus lies entirely above its counterpart in Figure 1
with no pensions (the thinly dotted line), the solution (ˆ x, ˆ γ) under PAYG involves a higher
growth rate and a lower consumption-capital ratio. Figure 3 furthermore illustrates how
KUJ modiﬁes the role of the pension system. Admiration (α = −0.5) augments the effect of
PAYG, raising the growth rate even more, while jealousy (α = 0.5) reverses it. Indeed, under
our parameterization, jealousy is more ‘powerful’ than PAYG, since ˆ γP
α=0.5 < ˆ γα=0, a result
depicted in Figure 3 by comparing the dotted and dashed relationships.
16To determine the effects of an increase in the statutory retirement date on the growth
equilibrium, we evaluate (52)–(53) at the solution values (ˆ x, ˆ rg):
Φ(ˆ rP
g,π,θ,uR) ≡ (ˆ rP
g − ρ)   [ˆ rP
g + (1− ε) Z0 − n] − σΩ(ˆ rP
g) ≡ 0, (58)
Γ(ˆ xP,π,θ,uR) = (ˆ xP)2 − [ρ + (1− ε) Z0 − n] ˆ xP − σΩ(ˆ rP
g) ≡ 0. (59)
Speciﬁcally, we analyze the implications of an increase in the statutory retirement age uR
which lowers the dependency ratio under both DB and DC schemes (see (34) above). Differ-


































∂Γ(ˆ xP,π,θ,uR)/∂ˆ xP ,
for i = DB or i = DC. We can show that a higher retirement age has an ambiguous effect on
growth and the consumption-capital ratio under both schemes. Nevertheless, we can iden-
tify the distinct implications of a rise in uR. An increase in uR raises labor supply, lowering
the wage w(t), which, in turn, shrinks the human wealth gap, [¯ h(t,t) − h(t)], and lowers
ˆ γP. On the other hand, a later statutory retirement age means that a larger fraction of the
population participates in the labor force. This increases generational turnover and raises
ˆ γP. The latter effect is augmented by the fact that the contribution rate θ paid by the active
part of the population falls to maintain PAYG budget balance under DB.
The general implications of a rise in uR under DC are similar to those under DB, with
the important exception that in the DC case the pay-out rate π received by retired workers
increases under the closure rule. This mitigates against the effect of a longer working life and
tends to reduce the human wealth gap, [¯ h(t,t) − h(t)]. For our parameterization, for which
the mandatory retirement age rises from 59.73 to 65 years, the negative effect on growth of
the rise in uR dominates, implying a decline in EEBY in Figure 4, whether or not the PAYG
system is DB or DC. Observe in Figure 4, however, that the fall in growth is signiﬁcantly
greater, due to the increase in π in the DC case, compared to the system under DB. Our
results suggest, then, that pension reform is more effective at maintaining growth under a
DB system.
8 Conclusions
A key limitation of the RA model compared to its OLG counterpart is its assumption of agent
homogeneity. The effects of demographic evolution, of course, cannot be addressed in the



























Figure 4: Growth and later retirement
RA setting. In contrast, the BY version of the OLG framework is particularly suited, due to
its convenient dynamic structure, to study the macroeconomic implications of demographic
change. In this paper we seek to investigate the implications of intergenerational turnover
for endogenous growth by extending our BY framework—featuring a well-deﬁned demog-
raphy and consumption externalities—to the standard AK growth model. We show that
the BY model extends naturally to the AK setting and provides a new avenue with which
to study the relationship between demography and economic growth. Among our ﬁndings,
we determine that the balanced growth rate, due to intergenerational turnover, is lower in
the BY framework compared to the basic AK model. Regarding demographic shocks, we
show that a fall in fertility and a decline in mortality—both characteristic of modern, in-
dustrialized societies—lead to a rise in the balanced growth rate. A greater degree of status
preference, in contrast, leads to a decline in economic growth, since the effects of intergener-
ational turnover become more pronounced.
In the second part of the paper we modify the BY model to incorporate a policy inter-
vention—a PAYG pension system—that directly impacts on the life-cycle return to human
wealth. WeﬁndthataPAYGsystemincreasesthebalancedgrowthratecomparedtoanecon-
omy that lacks one. The reason is that PAYG pensions impose an exogenous retirement date
and an old-age non-asset income stream that is lower than that of the active part of the pop-
18ulation. This creates an intergenerational turnover effect in human wealth, with newborns
possessing more of this type of wealth than average. This, in turn, acts as a countervailing
inﬂuence to the fact that newborns, compared to older population cohorts, have no ﬁnancial
wealth. With respect to changes in the parameters of the pension system, we show, using a
plausible numerical parameterization of the model, that an increase in the statutory retire-
ment date lowers balanced growth under both DB and DC schemes, although the decline in
growth is much less under DB.
Appendix A: Derivation of equations (16)–(17)
To calculate the expression for ˙ c(t)/c(t) in (16), we use Leibnitz’s Rule to differentiate c(t),
stated in (13), with respect to t:
˙ c(t) ≡ l (t,t) ¯ c(t,t) +
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ c(v,t)dv +
  t
−∞
˙ l (v,t) ¯ c(v,t)dv
= η¯ c(t,t) +
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ c(v,t)dv − η
  t
−∞




l (v,t) ˙ ¯ c(v,t)dv − η [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)], (A.1)
where we use (12) and (13) to obtain the second and third equalities of (A.1). The next step,
using the deﬁnition of ¯ x(v,τ) in (6), is to substitute for ˙ ¯ c(v,t) in the ﬁrst term of (A.1). Since
˙ ¯ c(v,t) ≡ (1− α) ˙ ¯ x(v,t) + α˙ c(t), this yields:
˙ c(t) = (1− α)
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ x(v,t)dv + α
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ c(t)dv − η [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)] (A.2)
= (1− α)[r(t) − ρ]
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ¯ x(v,t)dv + α˙ c(t)
  t
−∞
l (v,t)dv − η [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)],
where we substitute for ˙ ¯ x(v,t) = (r − ρ)¯ x(v,t) using (8) to obtain the second equality of
(A.2). Analogous to the deﬁnition of average consumption, x(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l (v,t) ¯ x(v,t)dv.
Furthermore, since cohort weights sum-up to unity,
  t
−∞ l (v,t)dv ≡ 1, and x(t) = c(t) holds
by deﬁnition, we can rewrite (A.2) to obtain the aggregate Euler equation:
˙ c(t) = [r(t) − ρ]c(t) −
η
1− α
  [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)], (A.3)
where [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)] corresponds to intergenerational turnover in consumption. To convert
(A.3) into the expression (16) in the main text, we evaluate (11) at v = t to ﬁnd:
¯ c(t,t) = (ρ + β)h(t) + α[c(t) − (ρ + β)Γ(t)], (A.4)
where ¯ a(t,t) = 0, since newborns only possess human wealth. In turn, aggregating (11) over
cohorts implies:
c(t) = (ρ + β)[a(t) + h(t)] + α[c(t) − (ρ + β)Γ(t)]. (A.5)
19Taking the difference between (A.5) and (A.4), we obtain [c(t) − ¯ c(t,t)] = (ρ + β)a(t) so
that (A.3) reduces to (16):
˙ c(t)
c(t)
= r − ρ −





where we have used a(t) = k(t). To derive (17), we differentiate a(t) stated in (13) with
respect to t to ﬁnd:
˙ a(t) = −η
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ¯ a(v,t)dv +
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ a(v,τ)dv, (A.6)
where we again use the fact that ¯ a(t,t) = 0 and substitute for ˙ l(v,t) = −ηl (v,t) to obtain
(A.6). Substituting for ˙ ¯ a(v,τ) from the budget identity (7) in (A.6), we obtain:
˙ a(t) = −η
  t
−∞




l (v,t)[(r + β) ¯ a(v,τ) + w(τ) − ¯ c(v,τ)]dv
= (r − n) a(t) + w(t) − c(t),
where n ≡ η − β. Finally, the fact that physical capital is the only form of savings, i.e.,
a(t) = k(t), means that (A.7) is equivalent to the market clearing relationship (17):
˙ k(t) = [r − n]k(t) + w(t) − c(t). (A.8)
Appendix B: Conditions on steady-state proﬁles
B.1 Condition for ¯ k(0,t) > 0
We begin by evaluating (7) at ¯ a(v,t) ≡ ¯ k(v,t) and substituting for ˆ w(t) = ˆ w0eˆ γt. Together
with (15), this yields:
˙ ¯ k(v,t) = (r + β) ¯ k(v,t) + ˆ w0eˆ γt − ¯ c(v,t) (B.1)
¯ c(v,t) − ˆ c(t) = (ρ + β)[¯ k(v,t) − ˆ k(t)]. (B.2)
Combining these expressions, we obtain the following differential equation in ˙ ¯ k(v,t):
˙ ¯ k(v,t) = (r − ρ) ¯ k(v,t) + (η + ρ + ˆ γ − r) ˆ k0eˆ γt. (B.3)
Solving (B.3) for v = 0, subject to ¯ k(0,0) = 0, gives:
¯ k(0,t) =
ρ + η + ˆ γ − r
r − ˆ γ − ρ
  ˆ k(t)   [e(r−ˆ γ−ρ)t − 1], (B.4)
which yields the following conditions for ¯ k(0,t) > 0:
(i) r − ˆ γ ≡ ˆ rg > ρ; (ii) r − ˆ γ ≡ ˆ rg < ρ + η. (B.5)
20B.2 Condition for ¯ c(0,t) > 0
Using the solutions ˆ k(t) = ˆ k0eˆ γt, ˆ w(t) = ˆ w0eˆ γt, and ˆ c(t) = ˆ c0eˆ γt along the growth path, we
can rewrite the Euler equation (16) and the market clearing condition (17) as:
(1− α)(r − ρ − ˆ γ) ˆ c0 = η (ρ + β) ˆ k0 (B.6)
[r − ˆ γ − (η − β)] ˆ k0 = ˆ c0 − ˆ w0,
Evaluating (B.2) at v = 0 and substituting for ˆ c(t) employing (B.6), newborn consumption
equals:
¯ c(0,t) =
η (ρ + β) ˆ k(t)
(1− α)(r − ρ − ˆ γ)
+ (ρ + β)[¯ k(0,t) − ˆ k(t)]. (B.7)
Employing the solution (B.4) for ¯ k(0,t), we substitute [¯ k(0,t) − ˆ k(t)] into (B.7) and, after
simplifying, we obtain the expression for ¯ c(0,t) in terms of ˆ k(t):
¯ c(0,t) =
(ρ + β) ˆ k(t)
r − ρ − ˆ γ
 





A feasible solution for newborn consumption, i.e., ¯ c(0,t) > 0, requires:




a condition automatically satisﬁed for 0 ≤ α < 1. If, instead, α < 0, then we must determine
a lower bound on the status parameter so that:




a task we perform now.
B.3 Upper and Lower Bounds on α
We ﬁrst derive the upper bound on the status parameter α. To do so, we use the polynomial
Φ(s) stated in (24) to prove ˆ rg < ρ + η ≡ rg1 stated in (B.5). This holds if Φ(rg1) > 0.





= η  
 













21To determine the lower bound on α, we prove ˆ rg < ρ + η +
αη
1−α ≡ rg2 given in (B.10) for





































Appendix C: Derivation of (46) and (47)
To ﬁnd the expression for (46), we ﬁrst solve for h(t) by substituting (43)–(44) that describe,



























Human wealth represents the present discounted value of wages, adjusted by the features
of the PAYG system and demographic parameters. Evaluating (43) at v = t, we can show






1− e−ηuR + (1− θ − π)e−βuR  
 
e−nuR − e−rguR  
. (C.3)
Combining (C.2)–(C.3), the turnover in human wealth thus equals:




To derive (47) for the PAYG case, we modify (A.6) to reﬂect the working and retired
phases of life:
˙ a(t) = −η
  t
−∞
l (v,t) ¯ a(v,t)dv +
  t
t−uR
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ a(v,τ)dv +
  t−uR
−∞
l (v,t) ˙ ¯ a(v,τ)dv. (C.5)
22Using (41) and (31) to substitute for ˙ a(t) in (C.5), we obtain:






l (v,t)dv− c(t), (C.6)
whereweusethedeﬁnitionsofaverageconsumptionandassetholdingsin(13). Substituting
for the cohort weights l(v,t) = ηeηt, t ≥ v, we evaluate (C.6) as:
˙ a(t) = (r − n) a(t) + (1− θ)w(t)
 
1− e−ηuR 
+ πw(t)e−ηuR − c(t). (C.7)
To simplify (C.7) and solve for the market clearing condition, we impose the PAYG budget
constraint θ   [1− e−ηuR] = π   e−ηuR and a(t) ≡ k(t) and obtain:




Appendix D: PAYG and the welfare of newborns
Using (43), we can ask the whether the PAYG system imposes a net burden on newborns.
The scenario we consider is the following: assume that newborns, whether or not they are
participants in the PAYG scheme, retire exogenously at age uR. If the newborn agent pays




































  (θ + π)e−βuR  
e−nuR − e−rguR 
. (D.3)
The question whether PAYG pensions reduce or augment ¯ h(t,t) dependes on the sign of the
term [e−nuR − e−rguR], which, in turn, depends on rg relative to n. If the well-known Aaron
condition holds, i.e., rg > n, then the sign of (D.3) is negative and the PAYG system reduces
human wealth at birth.
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